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Abstract 
This article addresses the question whether the Australian tests of defamation 
carry a seriousness threshold, akin to the Thornton threshold found in the English 
common law tests, notwithstanding differences between the two legal and 
constitutional environments. The question is important given that the statutory 
triviality defence has disappointed as the primary mechanism for weeding out 
‘unworthy’ defamation claims. If left unchecked, such claims can threaten the 
proper balance between freedom of speech and the protection of reputation, not 
to mention unreasonably burden the administration of justice. It will be argued 
that the threshold is inherent in the Australian tests, but if additional support is 
required, then recourse may be made to the emerging Bleyer abuse of process 
jurisdiction, albeit not without some qualification. This article advances the 
ongoing defamation reform debate in Australia by highlighting the potential 
availability of a largely neglected filter and, in so doing, uncovers the proper 
basis for assessing the need for additional or alternate measures for enhancing 
the law’s response to unworthy defamation claims. 
I Introduction 
A key element in an action for defamation is that the publication in question is 
defamatory. What is ‘defamatory’ is not defined in the Australian uniform national 
defamation legislation,1 and its elucidation is left, instead, to the common law.2  
In Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd v Chesterton,3 the High Court of Australia declared 
that ‘(t)he general test [for defamation] … [i]s whether the published matter is likely 
to lead an ordinary reasonable person to think the less of the plaintiff’,4 although this 
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3 (2009) 238 CLR 460 (‘Radio 2UE Sydney’).  
4 Ibid 467 (French CJ, Gummow, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 
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does not necessarily shut out other common law tests.5 Clearly the tests frame and 
constrain a plaintiff’s defamation claim and changing their scope will directly affect 
the size of the potential catchment area for successful claims. 
In 2011 in Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd,6 Tugendhat J identified 
a ‘threshold of seriousness’ in the English common law tests of defamation. The 
threshold quickly became an established feature of United Kingdom (‘UK’) 
defamation law. Recently, New Zealand (‘NZ’) High Court judges in CPA Australia 
Ltd v New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants7 and Opai v Culpan8 accepted 
such a limitation for the NZ common law tests. It is only natural to ask whether the 
Australian tests also carry such a threshold given their common pedigree. 
To date there has been no such declaration by an Australian court. The first, 
and (to the author’s knowledge) only, time that an Australian superior court has 
addressed the question of Thornton and ‘a minimum threshold of seriousness’ was 
the 2017 decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Lesses 
v Maras.9 However, in that case, there does not appear to have been full argument 
on the question, and the Court’s consideration only extended to a few paragraphs.10 
The Court stated that 
The passage from the judgment of Tugendhat J [in Thornton] … should be 
understood as merely an elucidation of the requirement that, to be defamatory, 
an imputation must tend to lower the estimation of the plaintiff by the 
community and an emphasis that an adverse opinion may be expressed about 
a person without its having such a tendency. The seriousness of the adverse 
opinion is obviously a factor to be taken into account in determining whether 
its expression does tend to lower the estimation of the plaintiff by the 
community. The passage should not be understood as creating an additional 
element of the cause of action for defamation.11 
Denying the threshold operates as ‘an additional element of the cause of 
action for defamation’,12 does not deny the possibility of the threshold being inherent 
in the defamation tests.13 Further, a determination of the proper meaning and effect 
of Thornton regarding a ‘seriousness threshold’ does not necessarily determine the 
status of such a threshold for the Australian tests of defamation. Accordingly, the 
question is still alive and awaits further judicial consideration in Australia. 
The question is important given its capacity to exclude ‘unworthy’ 
defamation claims. Such capacity is valuable for the purpose of maintaining the 
																																																								
5 Kim Gould, ‘The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning in the Wake of Radio 2UE Sydney v 
Chesterton’ (2015) 41(1) Australian Bar Review 44; contra Des Butler and Sharon Rodrick, 
Australian Media Law (Lawbook, 5th ed, 2015) 42; Alastair Mullis and Richard Parkes (eds), Gatley 
on Libel and Slander (Thomson Reuters, 12th ed, 2013) 36–7 n 32. 
6 [2011] 1 WLR 1985 (‘Thornton’). 
7 [2015] NZHC 1854 (6 August 2015) (Dobson J) (‘CPA Australia’). 
8 [2016] NZHC 3004 (13 December 2016) (Bell AsJ) (‘Opai’). 
9 [2017] SASCFC 48 (15 May 2017) (‘Lesses’). 
10 Ibid [122]–[125]. 
11 Ibid [125]. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See also David Rolph, ‘Triviality, Proportionality and A Threshold of Serious Harm’, Gazette of Law 
and Journalism, 25 August 2017 <http://www.glj.com.au/2911-article>. 
2017] THRESHOLD OF SERIOUSNESS IN DEFAMATION 335 
balance the law purports to strike between free speech and protection of reputation.14 
Allowing unworthy claims to proliferate without restraint is apt to tip that balance 
unduly in favour of reputation at the expense of free speech. It is also liable to burden 
the administration of justice unreasonably in terms of resources, costs and delay. The 
importance of this question will be heightened if existing Australian filters for 
unworthy claims are found wanting, especially under pressure from new 
communications technologies providing platforms for unmoderated communication 
by ordinary people with unprecedented audience reach. It has also become more 
pressing in the wake of recent calls for Australia to follow the UK’s lead and adopt 
its new ‘serious harm’ test found in Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 1(1).15 However, 
it would be useful to examine the current position regarding seriousness under 
Australian defamation law before proceeding in that direction. The analysis in this 
article will contribute to the necessary audit. 
It is trite to say that English decisions are no longer binding on Australian 
courts; but, they, like other foreign decisions, may be persuasive.16 A key factor that 
may detract from their persuasiveness, however, relates to differences between the 
legal and constitutional contexts of Australia and the other jurisdiction. Two 
potentially relevant differences between Australia and the UK are the absence of an 
equivalent to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (‘HRA’) in all of the Australian 
jurisdictions and the absence of a dedicated statutory triviality defence to a 
defamation action in the UK.17 The same may also be said of the relevant differences 
between Australia and NZ, save, of course, for replacing the HRA with the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). However, it is too superficial simply to dismiss 
the possibility of a seriousness threshold for Australia on the basis of these 
differences alone. A more nuanced and critical analysis is required, especially in the 
wake of recent Australian cases regarding the abuse of process jurisdiction, as well 
as the statutory triviality defence. 
The aim of this article is to conduct such an analysis. For this purpose, the 
Australian tests of defamation will be taken to include the ‘hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule’ test18 and the ‘shun and avoid’ test,19 in addition to the Radio 2UE Sydney 
‘general test’ stated above.20 It will be argued that a case can be made for finding an 
																																																								
14 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 568 (‘Lange’). 
15 c 26. See, eg, Judge Judith Gibson, ‘The Trouble with Australian Defamation Law – 1’, Gazette of Law 
and Journalism, 28 August 2015 <http://www.glj.com.au/2511-article>; Richard Coleman, ‘The 
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16 Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376, 390. 
17 See Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 33. 
18 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M & W 105, 342 (Parke B) (‘Parmiter’). Its three limbs can operate 
as independent tests, and these will be referred to as the ‘hatred’ test, the ‘contempt’ test and the 
‘ridicule’ test: see, eg, Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 443 
(‘Ettingshausen Trial’); Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008 (‘Berkoff’).  
19 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd (1934) 50 TLR 581, 587 (‘Youssoupoff’).  
20 It is arguable that of the two older tests, only the ‘shun and avoid’ test survives Radio 2UE Sydney 
(2009) 238 CLR 460: Gould, ‘The Common Law Tests of Defamatory Meaning’, above n 5, 
especially 66–77.  
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inbuilt, but as yet largely undeclared, ‘threshold of seriousness’ in these tests, 
notwithstanding the absence of a Human Rights Act as well as the presence of the 
statutory triviality defence throughout Australia. Should additional assistance be 
required, then resort may be made to the emerging Bleyer21 principle of 
proportionality as a head of abuse of process, although not without some 
qualification. Further support may be garnered from certain policy considerations of 
the kind that resonated in CPA Australia.22 Nevertheless, the minimum level at 
which the revealed threshold for seriousness is pitched is unclear but likely to be 
lower than Thornton and possibly too low to address adequately the 21st century 
need to exclude unworthy defamation claims. 
This article is structured as follows. Part II analyses the Thornton decision 
with a view to teasing out the reasoning underpinning the seriousness threshold 
identified by Tugendhat J in the English defamatory meaning tests, as well as 
identifying questions relevant to its discovery in the Australian tests. Part III then 
interrogates the Thornton primary and secondary reasons and their relevance in the 
Australian context. Part IV completes the English story by introducing the s 1(1) 
‘serious harm’23 test through the lens of early case law, but with the particular aim 
of emphasising its differences to the Thornton test. Although they both speak to 
minimum thresholds, they are very different thresholds. Part V follows with an 
analysis of the reasoning in the two NZ decisions, aiming to discern their relevance 
for Australia, as well as to uncover the true nature of the threshold recognised. Part 
VI goes on to examine key aspects of the Australian legal and constitutional context 
that may bear upon the recognition of a seriousness threshold. Prominent among 
these, apart from the absence of an HRA equivalent in all of the Australian 
jurisdictions, are the emergence of the Bleyer principle of proportionality and the 
narrow scope of the statutory triviality defence. Part VII then draws on the foregoing 
analysis to scrutinise the Australian defamatory meaning tests for a seriousness 
threshold and consider whether — and, if so, to what extent — external drivers may 
be needed and are available to support such a threshold. Finally, Part VIII provides 
an opportunity reflect on the ramifications of recognising a seriousness threshold in 
the Australian tests, including whether this step would go far enough to address the 
concerns prompting calls to import the English s 1(1) test. 
II The Thornton “Threshold of Seriousness” 
The proceedings in Thornton24 concerned an application for summary dismissal of 
an action for defamation arising out of an allegation of ‘copy approval’,25 made in a 
review of the plaintiff’s book, published in the print and online versions of the 
																																																								
21 Bleyer v Google Inc (2014) 88 NSWLR 670 (‘Bleyer’).  
22 [2015] NZHC 1854 (6 August 2015). 
23 Note, Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 1(2) deals with a particular application of the s 1(1) test to ‘a body 
that trades for profit’, the relevance of which in Australia is significantly limited by the restriction on 
‘[c]ertain corporations’ suing for defamation pursuant to Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 9 and so will 
not be examined in this article.  
24 [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 
25 This is the ‘practice’ of according ‘interviewees the right to read what [the author] proposed to say 
about them and alter it’: ibid 1989 referring to Statement of Claim (6.2). 
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defendant’s newspaper. In granting the defendant’s application, Tugendhat J held 
that the ‘copy approval’ allegation was not capable of conveying a defamatory 
meaning either personally or professionally but, if it was, then it was not capable of 
conveying a ‘sufficiently’ defamatory meaning; that is, one that passed the relevant 
‘threshold of seriousness’.26 In his Honour’s view, ‘whatever definition of 
“defamatory” is adopted, it must include a qualification or threshold of seriousness, 
so as to exclude trivial claims’.27 This ‘threshold of seriousness’ was conceived of 
as ‘some tendency or likelihood of adverse consequences for the claimant’.28 And it 
was stated to apply to both personal and business/professional defamation.29 His 
Honour gave two main reasons for this conclusion which are worth quoting in full:  
(i) It is in accordance with the true interpretation of Lord Atkin’s speech in 
Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237. It is also in accordance with the decision 
of Sharp J in Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group [2009] EWHC 2779 with 
which I respectfully agree. (ii) It is required by the development of the law 
recognised in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] QB 946 as 
arising from the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998: regard for article 10 
and the principle of proportionality both require it.30 
Justice Tugendhat examined seven definitions of defamatory meaning,31 
including the classic common law trio familiar to Australia — namely, the ‘hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule’ test,32 the ‘shun and avoid’ test33 and Lord Atkin’s ‘lowering 
in the estimation of others’ test.34 With one exception,35 Tugendhat J found that a 
‘threshold of seriousness’ was ‘explicitly or implicitly’ carried in the terms of each 
test,36 although in some tests — and notably the ‘hatred’, ‘contempt’ and ‘shun and 
avoid’ tests — it may be set ‘too high’.37 The exception was what his Honour hailed 
as having ‘most often been used’38 in recent times and that was Lord Atkin’s test. 
Justice Tugendhat differentiated this definition on the basis ‘that it directs attention 
to the “estimation” of right-thinking persons, and make [sic] no express mention of 
any adverse consequences that might result. Attention is directed only to what is in 
the mind of the publishee’.39 Interestingly, while the ‘hatred’ and ‘contempt’ tests 
also appear to be confined to ‘what is in the mind of the publishee’, Tugendhat J was 
of the view that ‘[i]f the feelings of the publishee are sufficiently strong to be 
																																																								
26 Ibid 2010–1. 
27 Ibid 2008. 
28 Ibid 2002. 
29 Ibid 2009. 
30 Ibid 2008–9. 
31 These definitions were drawn from the listing given by Neill LJ in Berkoff [1996] 4 All ER 1008: 
ibid 1994–6.  
32 Is the publication ‘calculated to injure the reputation of another, by exposing him to hatred, contempt, 
or ridicule’?: Parmiter (1840) 6 M&W 105, 342. 
33 ‘[Whether the matter] tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided’?: Youssoupoff (1934) 50 
TLR 581, 587 (Slesser LJ). 
34 ‘[W]ould the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society 
generally?’: Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240 (‘Sim’).  
35 That is, putting aside the ‘ridicule’ limb, which is discussed below. 
36 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2002. 
37 Ibid 2002, 2006, 2008.  
38 Ibid 2002. 
39 Ibid. 
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signified by these words, then adverse consequences must be implicit’.40 It would 
seem then that ‘lowering in the estimation’ was not considered to be ‘sufficiently 
strong’ of itself to give rise implicitly to ‘adverse consequences’.41 
Nevertheless, Tugendhat J was able to find the ‘threshold of seriousness’ for 
Lord Atkin’s definition in a later passage in his Lordship’s speech in Sim,42 which read: 
[t]hat juries should be free to award damages for injuries to reputation is one 
of the safeguards of liberty. But the protection is undermined when 
exhibitions of bad manners or discourtesy are placed on the same level as 
attacks on character; and are treated as actionable wrongs.43 
So, while the threshold of seriousness was not discoverable from the 
oft-quoted terms of Lord Atkin’s test alone, it emerged upon a proper reading of his 
Lordship’s speech, which entailed reading those terms in conjunction with another 
passage in that speech.44 Justice Tugendhat conceded that this connection between 
the two passages had largely escaped attention though not completely.45 His Honour 
also acknowledged that the threshold arose in the rediscovered passage ‘by way of 
example or illustration and not by formulating a test for the degree of seriousness 
required’.46 
Justice Tugendhat’s second reason drew upon two external factors or drivers. 
One is Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc47 and the other is the HRA, which 
may also be seen to operate indirectly through Jameel. 
The HRA is generally understood as ‘incorporating’ the European 
Convention on Human Rights48 (‘ECHR’) into the domestic law of the UK,49 
although the proposition may need some qualification.50 Its effect for present 
purposes is to require ‘defamation law … [to] be understood in a rights-compliant 
manner’.51 The key ECHR articles in this regard are art 10 (‘[f]reedom of 
expression’) and art 8 (‘[r]ight to respect for private and family life’), noting that art 
8 has been interpreted as extending protection to reputation.52 Further, it has been 
held that ‘neither article has as such precedence over the other’.53 
																																																								
40 Ibid. 
41  Ibid. 
42 Ibid 2002, 2005. 
43 [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1242. 
44 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2004–5, 2007, 2008. 
45 Ibid 2004–5. 
46 Ibid 2005, 2008. 
47 [2005] QB 946 (‘Jameel’). 
48 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms European Convention 
on Human Rights, opened for signature on 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 
3 September 1953) (‘ECHR’). 
49 See HRA c 42, s 1. 
50 Andrew Nicol, Gavin Millar and Andrew Sharland, Media Law and Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed, 2009) 42–3; N A Moreham and Mark Warby (eds), Tugendhat and Christie: 
The Law of Privacy and the Media (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2016) 17 n 73. 
51 Mullis and Parkes, above n 5, 13 referring specifically to HRA ss 3(1), 6(1). 
52 See, eg, Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273, 290. 
53 In Re S (A Child) (Identification: Restrictions on Publication) [2005] 1 AC 593, 603 (emphasis in 
original). See also, In Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999) [2010] 1 AC 145, 164. 
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Jameel concerned an article in the defendant’s online subscription journal, 
together with a hyperlinked donor list allegedly imputing financial support of an 
infamous terrorist organisation. The proceedings for defamation were permanently 
stayed as an abuse of process. Although the imputation was serious, the extent of 
publication in England was very small. Only five subscribers in England had 
accessed the material and three of these had some connection with the plaintiff.54 
Applying the same test for setting aside permission to serve tort proceedings outside 
of the jurisdiction, the English Court of Appeal found that ‘the five publications … 
did not … amount to a real and substantial tort’ and concluded, therefore, that they 
constituted an abuse of process.55 Significantly, Lord Phillips MR explained that 
[a]n abuse of process is of concern not merely to the parties but to the court. 
It is no longer the role of the court simply to provide a level playing-field and 
to referee whatever game the parties choose to play upon it. The court is 
concerned to ensure that judicial and court resources are appropriately and 
proportionately used in accordance with the requirements of justice.56 
Then, in what has become an oft-cited passage, his Lordship declared, 
If the claimant succeeds in this action and is awarded a small amount of 
damages, it can perhaps be said that he will have achieved vindication for the 
damage done to his reputation in this country, but both the damage and the 
vindication will be minimal. The cost of the exercise will have been out of all 
proportion to what has been achieved. The game will not merely not have 
been worth the candle, it will not have been worth the wick.57 
In the particular case his Lordship concluded that ‘[i]t would be an abuse of process 
to continue to commit the resources of the English court, including substantial judge 
and possibly jury time, to an action where so little is now seen to be at stake’.58 
Thus emerged the Jameel proportionality principle, as a head of abuse of 
process, from a cradle comprised of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) (‘CPR’)59 
(especially the r 1.1 ‘overriding objective’s requirement for proportionality’) as well 
as the HRA.60 This principle became a regular feature of the UK defamation 
landscape prior to Thornton,61 although its exercise was regarded as ‘exceptional’ 
having regard to its serious consequences for claimants.62 Further, while it is not 
confined to defamation actions,63 it may nevertheless have more work to do in that 
context in the absence of ‘a proportionate small claims procedure’.64 
In addition to these two primary reasons, Tugendhat J also drew support from 
a claimed mutual symbiotic relationship between the ‘threshold of seriousness’ and 
the presumption of damage: 
																																																								
54 Jameel [2005] QB 946, 957 (‘members of the claimant’s camp’). 
55 Ibid 970. 
56 Ibid 965. 
57 Ibid 969–70. 
58 Ibid 970. 
59 SI 1998/3132. 
60 Jameel [2005] QB 946, 966. 
61 See Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2003–4 and the examples cited at [62]–[63]. 
62 Ames v The Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409, 3419 (‘Ames’). 
63 Ibid, citing Sullivan v Bristol Film Studios Ltd [2012] EMLR 27 (‘Sullivan’). 
64 Jameel [2005] QB 946, 970. And see Sullivan [2012] EMLR 27, 663. 
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If the likelihood of adverse consequences for a claimant is part of the 
definition of what is defamatory, then the presumption of damage is the 
logical corollary of what is already included in the definition. And conversely, 
the fact that in law damage is presumed is itself an argument why an 
imputation should not be held to be defamatory unless it has a tendency to 
have adverse effects upon the claimant.65 
Further, his Honour relied upon the precedential status of Sim as House of Lords 
authority, and the absence of any authority to the contrary.66 Subsequently, in 
Dell’Olio v Associated Newspapers Ltd,67 Tugendhat J expressly proclaimed another 
pillar for the Thornton ‘threshold of seriousness’ in ECHR art 8, in view of case law 
requiring ‘that intrusions must reach a certain level of seriousness to engage the 
operation of the Convention’.68 
Justice Tugendhat then went on to proffer his preferred definition of ‘what is 
defamatory?’ as follows: ‘the publication of which he complains may be defamatory 
of him because it [substantially] affects in an adverse manner the attitude of other 
people towards him, or has a tendency so to do’.69 This is a revised version of one 
of Neill LJ’s definitions,70 which imports the sufficiency of ‘a tendency or 
likelihood’ regarding the publication’s requisite impact from other tests and 
authority and makes clear that it carries a ‘threshold of seriousness’ pitched at the 
level of ‘substantial’.71 In his Lordship’s view, ‘substantial’ was ‘the lowest 
threshold that might be envisaged’ from the case law.72 
The Thornton seriousness threshold was assumed (without deciding the 
issue) by the English Court of Appeal in Cammish v Hughes73 and again in Elliott v 
Rufus.74 In Cammish, Arden LJ declared: 
The law does not provide remedies for inconsequential statements, that is, of 
trivial content or import. It is necessary that there should be some threshold 
test of seriousness to avoid normal social banter or discourtesy ending up in 
litigation and to avoid interfering with the right to freedom of expression 
conferred by article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.75 
The imputation in that case of ‘a seriously incompetent business person’ was 
found to have crossed the Thornton seriousness threshold.76 However, ‘[m]inor 
criticisms’ of a junior administrative assistant’s work performance,77 ‘[‘insulting’] 
																																																								
65 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2009. 
66 Ibid 2008. 
67 [2011] EWHC 3472 (QB) (20 December 2011) (‘Dell’Olio’). 
68 Ibid [13]–[15], quoting R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307, 
344 and see other authorities cited in [15].  
69 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2009–10 (emphasis and square brackets in original). 
70 See Berkoff [1996] 4 All ER 1008, 1018. 
71 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2003, 2009. 
72 Ibid 2009. 
73 [2013] EMLR 13, 302 (‘Cammish’). 
74 [2015] EMLR 17, 401, 404. 
75 [2013] EMLR 13, 302. 
76 Ibid 302–3. 
77 Daniels v British Broadcasting Corporation [2010] EWHC 3057 (QB) (24 November 2010)  
[48]–[50] (‘Daniels’). 
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references to [a ‘very well known’ woman’s] lifestyle, money and wealth’,78 and the 
suggestion that ‘[an employee] sent pompous messages’79 failed to do so. 
Several questions arise concerning the Thornton seriousness threshold. One 
is, to what is the threshold directed? Is it the gravity of the imputation or this plus 
other factors including the extent of publication? Support for both contenders may 
be found in Cammish. While the Court declared that ‘seriousness is a multi-factorial 
question’, it did not specify a set of relevant factors and its Thornton enquiry seemed 
confined to the ‘inherent gravity’ of the allegation in question, in accordance with 
the opening sentence of the passage from the judgment quoted above.80 Gatley on 
Libel and Slander specifies a range of relevant factors that extend beyond ‘the nature 
and inherent gravity of the allegation’ to include, for example, the ‘number of 
publishees’.81 But these appear to speak to the more wide-ranging assessments 
undertaken on a Jameel proportionality inquiry and also under the statutory ‘serious 
harm’ test. Yet, the Thornton threshold has been described as ‘a specific version of 
the broader Jameel abuse of process jurisdiction’,82 which speaks to it having a 
narrower compass consistent with being confined to an imputation’s gravity, 
although not necessarily exclusively. 
Another question is, what does ‘substantial’ mean in terms of the level at 
which the threshold is pitched? Some guidance may be obtained from the denotation 
of claims sought to be excluded by the threshold as ‘trivial’.83 But, is everything that 
is not ‘trivial’ necessarily ‘substantial’ or is there a level (or two or more) in 
between? While the trio of failed meanings reported above demonstrates that trivial 
imputations will not cross the threshold,84 they do not of themselves negate the 
possibility of a marginally-more- than- trivial imputation not failing to do so. A more 
comprehensive survey of the decided cases may yield a better picture of where the 
cut-off lies in practice, but it may not consist of a single point. Some convergence 
may be achieved by articulating more precisely the requisite level, but this is no easy 
task. Where, for example, do ‘significant’, ‘substantial’ and ‘serious’ sit on a 
seriousness scale? And how low is ‘trivial’ on this scale and where does it sit in 
relation to ‘minor’, ‘mild’ and ‘slightly’? 
There is also the question of the treatment of ‘ridicule’ in Thornton. Unlike 
the ‘hatred’ and ‘contempt’ tests, Tugendhat J did not specifically locate a 
seriousness threshold for the ‘ridicule’ test for reasons that are not clear. Granted 
ridicule was excluded as an issue,85 but so was the ‘shun and avoid’ test and yet his 
Honour still went ahead to locate its seriousness threshold.86 The capacity of ridicule 
to register low levels of seriousness would seem to enliven the issue of a minimum 
‘ridicule’ threshold, especially considering it had been located elsewhere, including 
																																																								
78 Dell’Olio [2011] EWHC 3472 (QB) (20 December 2011) [28], [32]. 
79 Briggs v Jordan [2013] EWHC 3205 (QB) (24 October 2013) [21]. 
80 Cammish [2013] EMLR 13, 302–3. 
81 Mullis and Parkes, above n 5, 39, but cf 41. 
82 Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott, ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 77(1) 
Modern Law Review 87, 105. 
83 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 2008. 
84 See above nn 77–80 and accompanying text. 
85 Thornton [2011] 1 WLR 1985, 1997. 
86 Ibid 1997, 2002. 
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Australia.87 If a minimum threshold was already inherent in the English ‘ridicule’ 
test, then it would be reasonable to expect that it would be articulated and its level 
assessed as part of Tugendhat J’s detailed examination of the English defamation 
tests, noting in particular that it extended to revealing the ‘implicit’ thresholds 
carried by ridicule’s two compatriots in the old composite test.88 Although his 
Honour’s conclusion regarding the presence of a seriousness threshold was 
expressed in the all-encompassing terms of ‘whatever definition of “defamatory” is 
adopted’,89 the position regarding the ‘ridicule’ minimum threshold is not 
necessarily without doubt. 
III Interrogating the Thornton Reasons 
In preparation for the examination of the Australian defamation tests in Part VII, it 
is necessary to interrogate the Thornton reasons further with respect to their reliance 
upon certain UK drivers and, specifically, the HRA and its progeny, such as the 
Jameel proportionality principle. Any such reliance will be inversely proportional to 
the transportability of the Thornton threshold to jurisdictions lacking in these drivers. 
The smaller that reliance, the greater the threshold’s transportability, and vice versa. 
Close inspection of Thornton reasoning reveals that it may not be as dependent on 
HRA considerations as may appear to be the case at first sight. 
In the first place, it is to Lord Atkin’s ‘lowering in the estimation of others’ 
test that Tugendhat J’s two main reasons90 appear to be largely directed, noting that 
of the tests reviewed it was the only test not found to carry a seriousness threshold 
inherent in its usual terms.91 It is arguable, then, that if nothing further was required 
to locate a seriousness threshold in the other tests, HRA considerations could be 
treated as ‘a check or test of the correctness of’92 a threshold that already exists as 
opposed to being integral to the supply of such a threshold for those tests. 
Second, of the two main reasons, only one is expressly tied to the HRA and 
that is the second. It is also tied to that Act implicitly through its reference to Jameel. 
However, to proclaim, as that reason does, that the HRA and Jameel ‘both require 
[the seriousness threshold]’93 is different to asserting that both are necessary to 
sustain this threshold or that it could not be sustained by one or other alone or, 
perhaps, even by means other than these authorities. So, it is arguable that the 
discovery of a seriousness threshold in the absence of one or other of these 
authorities, or possibly even both, is not inconsistent with this Thornton reason. 
Third, while the first limb of the first Thornton reason seems to be impervious 
to HRA considerations given that Sim was decided well before the introduction of 
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the HRA, old authorities may be reinterpreted in the light of changed conditions and, 
indeed, Tugendhat J foreshadowed this possibility earlier in his judgment.94 
However, this does not necessarily preclude ‘the true interpretation of Lord Atkin’s 
speech’,95 as revealed by Tugendhat J, emerging otherwise than through a HRA lens. 
Further, the potential of the second limb of this reason to open a portal to HRA 
infusion by virtue of its reference to Ecclestone v Telegraph Media Group Ltd,96  
a post-HRA decision, is limited by the difficulty of constituting this limb as an 
essential step in Thornton reasoning. It presents, rather, as additional support for the 
threshold already established by the first limb and can expect only modest assistance 
from Ecclestone’s precedential status as a High Court decision. 
Fourth, the linking of the seriousness threshold to the presumption of damage 
in mutually supportive ways97 also appears, on its face, to be HRA agnostic. It could 
be argued, however, that closer inspection reveals a small area of HRA sensitivity by 
way of employing what appears to be a revised version of the presumption. The 
revision takes account of the concession made in Jameel to the potential for 
incompatibility between the presumption and ECHR art 10 to arise ‘in the rare case 
where a claimant[’s] … reputation has suffered no or minimal actual damage’,98 
albeit not such as to warrant the abolition of the presumption because in that ‘rare 
case’ the defendant would not be left without any course of action.99 Nevertheless, 
the significance of any HRA sensitivity thereby arising may be largely discounted 
by the subsidiary nature of this Thornton reason. 
Consequently, the relevance of HRA considerations to the location of the 
Thornton seriousness threshold appears to be largely confined to Lord Atkin’s test. 
This, in turn, appears to turn largely on the correctness of Tugendhat J’s analysis of 
Lord Atkin’s speech in Sim. If that speech can stand up to scrutiny, then there seems 
to be no need to resort to an external driver to supply a threshold. The revision of 
Lord Atkin’s test effectively puts it in the same position as the other tests in that a 
seriousness threshold may now be found inherent in its terms (albeit now enlarged) 
and the HRA is only relevant for ancillary purposes. At the highest, it operates as an 
additional, as distinct from a necessary, reason for the threshold. However, it may 
be necessary to resort to the HRA and Jameel for the purpose of setting the threshold 
at ‘substantial’ given that the examples contained in Lord Atkin’s rediscovered 
passage appear to speak to a lower level of seriousness. If, however, Tugendhat J’s 
analysis of Lord Atkin’s speech cannot stand up to scrutiny, then something extra 
would be required to both supply the threshold and set it at ‘substantial’. In this event, 
HRA considerations and/or the Jameel proportionality principle may operate as 
fall-back reasons, the possibility of which was anticipated by Tugendhat J.100 
From this analysis, it becomes apparent that the Thornton seriousness 
threshold may be freed from HRA and Jameel considerations, as regards its existence 
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if not the level at which it is pitched as well. The transportability thereby effectively 
accorded the threshold regarding jurisdictions in which such considerations do not 
have a foothold will be of critical significance when it comes to assessing the 
threshold’s status in Australia. 
IV Two Different English Thresholds 
The UK has moved on from the ‘twin-track approach [of Thornton and Jameel] to 
the elimination of trivial defamation claims’,101 to add a statutory ‘serious harm’ 
filter. This forms part of the defamation law reform package legislated in 
Defamation Act 2013 (UK) that commenced operation in 2014.102 It is important to 
pause here to emphasise and explain that this is a very different threshold to the 
Thornton threshold and that the difference is shaping up to be much more than 
simply a difference in pitch. 
Defamation Act 2013 (UK) s 1(1) provides: ‘A statement is not defamatory 
unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation 
of the claimant.’ According to the Explanatory Notes, it ‘builds on’ Thornton and 
Jameel, but ‘raises the bar for bringing a claim’.103 A stricter test for filtering out 
trivial defamation claims was sought in the ‘public interest’ of preventing ‘wealthy 
individuals and organisations … [from stifling] comment and debate that has no 
significant impact on their reputation’.104 It is still early days for this test and its 
features are still being worked out by the courts. At the time of writing, it has yet to 
receive appellate scrutiny, although judgment has been reserved by the English 
Court of Appeal in the appeals from Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd.105 
Nevertheless, several significant differences between the statutory test and its 
Thornton common law progenitor can be discerned in the developing first instance 
jurisprudence. 
Although the s 1(1) test is acknowledged to be stricter than the Thornton 
test,106 any enhanced stringency is not the result of simply changing the dial on the 
Thornton filter from ‘substantial’ to ‘serious’,107 but by changing the actual filter. 
This is not unexpected given its Jameel bloodline. Whereas the Thornton test 
concentrates on tendency to harm reputation, the focus of the s 1(1) test is 
reputational harm having been caused or likely to be caused, which requires proof 
on the balance of probabilities.108 In other words, Thornton ‘tendency’ is not the 
same as the combined effect of s 1(1) ‘likely to cause’ plus ‘has caused’. 
Consequently, the enquiry into s 1(1) ‘serious harm’ is wider than that 
concerning the Thornton ‘seriousness’ threshold, extending beyond ‘the 
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defamatory meaning of the words and the harmful tendency of that meaning’ to 
‘all the relevant circumstances, including evidence of what has actually happened 
after publication’.109 In Lachaux, an article that was found to convey a defamatory 
meaning of ‘wife-beat[ing]’, did not satisfy the s 1(1) test because the impugned 
words were not ‘the primary focus’ of the article, constituting a small portion at 
its end, but also had a small online audience reach.110 The publication in Cooke v 
MGN Ltd111 failed the s 1(1) test because of ‘a prompt and prominent apology’.112 
Further, whereas Thornton tendency can be assessed from the impugned 
words,113 s 1(1) requires the claimant ‘to prove [serious harm] as a fact on the balance 
of probabilities’.114 This could be a very onerous burden for the claimant.115 
However, it also appears to be accepted that proof for this purpose does not always 
necessitate adducing direct evidence of ‘tangible adverse consequences’, but can 
instead be satisfied by the drawing of inferences.116 The ‘obvious’ example, given 
in Cooke, is where ‘a national newspaper with a large circulation wrongly accuses 
someone of being a terrorist or a paedophile’.117 However, it is unclear whether proof 
by inference is also available in ‘less obvious cases’.118 
There is another, related sense in which the two tests may be said to differ in 
kind that has been highlighted in the legal commentary — that is, whereas the 
Thornton test is a test of what is defamatory, the s 1(1) test is a test of whether 
defamation is actionable.119 Nevertheless, Descheemaeker has opined that even the 
‘actionability’ characterisation ‘appears misguided’.120 
Flowing from their differences in kind, the two tests differ markedly in their 
ramifications for settled principles of defamation law. The s 1(1) test has been 
construed as impliedly abolishing the presumption of damage in defamation law.121 
If it does, then this constitutes a major departure from a long-standing principle of 
defamation law. It also differs from the approach taken in Thornton where the 
presumption, albeit in a modified form, was relied upon to support the seriousness 
threshold. Although recognising the Jameel concession to ‘no or minimal damage’ 
claims, Tugendhat J was clearly not of the view that it was such as to swallow up 
the whole presumption.122 
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It also appears that under the s 1(1) test, the defamatory ‘status’ of a 
publication (in the sense of its actionability) can change over time from defamatory 
to non-defamatory and also from non-defamatory to defamatory.123 However, the 
precise time for determining ‘serious harm’ and, in particular, whether it should be 
‘the date on which the claim is issued’124 or ‘the time at which the issue is 
determined’,125 remains unsettled.126 This ‘shifting’ quality constitutes another 
departure from ordinary defamation law principles,127 let alone the change from the 
time of publication as the critical time for determining actions for defamation. 
The two tests also have different costs ramifications. To the extent that the 
Thornton threshold carries a cost burden, this is arguably much less than that 
potentially entailed by the s 1(1) requirement to prove serious harm, even accounting 
for any relief by way of proof by inference. The s 1(1) costs issue is attracting a lot 
of attention in the case law, with concern expressed regarding the prospect of 
‘wasteful duplication’ should a claimant pass the s 1(1) hurdle at a preliminary issues 
hearing and then proceed to trial.128 It remains to be seen how far ‘appropriate case 
management’129 can remedy the situation. 
Accordingly, as the authorities currently stand, moving to the s 1(1) test poses 
a very different proposition to recognising the Thornton threshold. In addition to the 
matters mentioned above, and in consideration of those matters, it would almost 
certainly be regarded as a reform outside the proper power of Australian courts to 
initiate and implement and require instead parliamentary assistance as it did in the 
UK. Whether s 1(1) offers a better mechanism for weeding out unworthy claims than 
the Thornton threshold, let alone the best of all possible mechanisms for this 
purpose, warrants an investigation beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, the 
foregoing analysis has highlighted two major challenges regarding its adoption in 
Australia. These are its potential to disrupt well-settled principles of defamation law 
as well as to increase costs early in defamation proceedings. 
V A “Seriousness Threshold” for New Zealand 
The proceedings in CPA Australia130 arose out of ‘criticisms’ made by the acting 
Chief Executive Officer of one professional accounting body about another 
professional accounting body in two conference addresses. In refusing a declaration 
of liability for defamation, the NZ High Court held that the plaintiff corporate body 
had failed to show relevant pecuniary loss pursuant to the Defamation Act 1992 
(NZ).131 However, in obiter dicta remarks, Dobson J went on to ‘endorse’ a 
seriousness threshold for the NZ common law tests of defamatory meaning.132  
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His Honour drew support from the NZ equivalent of ECHR art 10 in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 14, the provision of local statutory 
alternatives to litigation for defamation, and policy considerations around promoting 
better decision-making on the question of litigating defamation as well as limiting 
‘unjustified [free speech] infringements’.133 
The proceedings in Opai,134 consisted of several interlocutory applications 
relating to an action for defamation concerning four workplace documents authored 
by the claimant’s supervisor. In determining the defamatory quality of the impugned 
statements, the NZ High Court recognised the Thornton seriousness threshold, and 
applied the Thornton test of defamatory meaning to find that all the meanings found 
capable of being conveyed by the publications in question were capable of being 
defamatory.135 
However, it is not clear whether the threshold applied in CPA Australia was 
the Thornton threshold or some other threshold possibly more akin to the English 
s 1(1) test.136 In Opai, the Thornton threshold was kept separate from the s 1(1) test, 
but its adoption was not supported by any explanation or authority. It was simply 
declared, although similarities between the NZ and English legal and constitutional 
environments were highlighted in the judgment, including ‘the general trend in New 
Zealand … to recognise the [Jameel abuse jurisdiction]’.137 
The apparent conflation of the two English seriousness thresholds and the 
absence of supporting analysis coupled with NZ’s different legal context detracts 
from the persuasiveness of these decisions before Australian courts, even putting 
aside their precedential status as decisions of single judges of the NZ High Court. 
Nevertheless, policy considerations appealed to in CPA Australia may resonate in 
Australia. 
VI The Australian Legal and Constitutional Context 
Before scrutinising the Australian tests of defamation, it is necessary to briefly 
explore key aspects of the Australian legal and constitutional context that may bear 
upon the location of a seriousness threshold. 
A Common Tests But Not Without Difference 
It is apparent from the earlier articulation of the Australian tests of defamation,138 
that they share a pedigree with the English tests, noting in particular that the Radio 
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2UE Sydney ‘general test’ is derived from Lord Atkin’s ‘lowering in the estimation 
of others’ test.139 However, there are two important local differences. 
First, there is authority recognising a seriousness threshold for the ‘ridicule’ 
test in Australia since at least Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd,140 
which pre-dates Thornton by some 20 years. In Ettingshausen, a photograph of an 
Australian rugby league footballer in the shower was published in a magazine 
without consent. Justice Hunt cast his assessment of the defamatory capacity of one 
of the pleaded imputations in terms that it was ‘capable of subjecting the entirely 
blameless plaintiff to a more than a trivial degree of ridicule’.141 Interestingly, this 
threshold was not sourced in English common law, but in a United States case.142 
The prior recognition of a seriousness threshold for this test is significant in that it 
provides a precedent for the recognition of such thresholds in Australia in the 
absence of HRA considerations and in the presence of a statutory triviality 
defence.143 It also it fills an apparent lacuna left by the Thornton analysis in relation 
to the ‘ridicule’ test. However, while there are first instance authorities accepting the 
ridicule threshold,144 they do not number many and the threshold has yet to be tested 
at the appellate level.145 This inactivity could be a function of a small number of 
ridicule cases coming before the courts, but, in any event, the existence of the ridicule 
threshold does not present a live issue. It may be a different matter, however, 
regarding the level at which it is pitched. The free speech sensitivities of the 21st 
century may call for a higher setting. Further, while the recognition of the ridicule 
threshold may promote receptiveness to the idea of a seriousness threshold in 
Australia, it does not of itself transport this requirement to the other Australian tests 
of defamation. 
The second local difference of note concerns the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general 
test’ and its retirement of Lord Atkin’s ‘right-thinking members of society generally’ 
in favour of the ‘ordinary reasonable person’ as the relevant hypothetical referee.146 
This was done to disoblige, yet not disallow, this person from having regard to 
‘moral or social standards’ when assessing defamatory meaning.147 This revision 
does not undermine the possibility of locating a seriousness threshold in the Radio 
2UE Sydney ‘general test’. On the contrary, there is post-Thornton English authority 
to the effect that the ‘ordinary reasonable sensible person’ model ‘implicit[ly]’ 
carries a seriousness threshold in that such a person would not ‘think the less of 
																																																								
139 Radio 2UE Sydney (2009) 238 CLR 460, 466, 477. 
140 (1991) 23 NSWLR 443. 
141 Ibid 449 (emphasis added). This finding was not disturbed on appeal: Australian Consolidated Press 
Ltd v Ettingshausen [1993] NSWCA 10 (13 October 1993) (‘Ettingshausen Appeal’).  
142 Burton v Crowell Pub Co 82 F 2d 154, 156 (Learned Hand J) (2nd Cir, 1936). See Ettingshausen Trial 
(1991) 23 NSWLR 443, 448. 
143 See Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 13, repealed by the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW). 
144 See Obermann v ACP Publishing Pty Limited [2001] NSWSC 1022 (16 November 2001) [37]–[40]; 
Hanson-Young v Bauer Media Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1306 (11 September 2013) [37]; Hanson-Young 
v Bauer Media Ltd (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 2029 (9 December 2013) [20]. 
145 The issue was not addressed by the NSW Court of Appeal in Ettingshausen Appeal [1993] NSWCA 
10 (13 October 1993) and ‘the correctness of Ettingshausen [Trial]’ was not challenged in McDonald 
v The North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 62, 65–6. 
146 Radio 2UE Sydney (2009) 238 CLR 460, 467, 478, 484.  
147 Ibid 477–80, 484; Corby v Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd (2014) Aust Torts Reports ¶82–184, 67,723–67,724. 
2017] THRESHOLD OF SERIOUSNESS IN DEFAMATION 349 
[someone]’ because of ‘[m]inor criticisms’.148 However, the level of seriousness 
may not be the same as that effected by Lord Atkin’s hypothetical referee. 
B Defamation Law and the Australian Federation 
In the Australian federal system, defamation law is a matter regulated by the states 
and territories and not the Commonwealth. However, for more than a decade, 
Australia has enjoyed (substantially) uniform defamation legislation by virtue of 
each state and territory enacting legislation in (substantially) identical terms.149 
Nevertheless, this legislation is not a code, and defamation law in Australia consists 
instead of a mix of legislation and common law.150 
The challenge of maintaining the uniformity of this law cannot be 
underestimated and manifests in two important ways in the present context. 
First, while an Intergovernmental Agreement between the states and 
territories facilitates the maintenance of the uniformity of the national defamation 
legislation,151 the availability and operation of measures to maintain the uniformity 
of the common law component of the national scheme is less certain. The well-
known precedent rule supporting adherence to intermediate appellate court decisions 
by equivalent and lower courts concerning the interpretation of national uniform 
legislation ‘unless convinced that that interpretation is plainly wrong’,152 does not 
directly speak to decisions regarding the common law component of such schemes 
that are not the direct product of interpretation of its legislative component. Further, 
it is not clear whether and, if so, to what extent the principle of ‘one common law in 
Australia’153 may be called upon to assist. Although the principle has been 
proclaimed by the highest court in Australia with some regularity,154 it is not without 
its critics,155 and its operation may also be challenged in areas, such as defamation 
law, that do not give rise to frequent appeals to the High Court and so provide 
frequent opportunities for that court’s guidance and correction.156 
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Second, uniformity of the national defamation scheme may be undermined 
by lack of uniformity regarding the regulation of aspects falling outside its purview, 
but which nevertheless affect a defamation claim. The national defamation scheme 
does not, for example, extend to the case management of such claims before the 
courts, and legislation and rules regarding this aspect are not otherwise made 
uniform across all Australian jurisdictions. The condition of varying state/territory 
legislation has also been highlighted as a challenge to the ‘one common law’ 
concept.157 
Consequently, any change by the courts to the common law component of 
Australian defamation law, such as recognising a seriousness threshold, may 
struggle to be effected uniformly throughout all the states and territories and 
especially where it relies upon ‘allied’ laws for support. 
C The Absence of a Human Rights Act 
As yet, Australia does not have a Bill of Rights and there is no express guarantee of 
free speech in the Australian Constitution. While the courts have recognised an 
implied constitutional guarantee of political communication,158 this is generally 
regarded as ‘a frail shield’.159 But even if the implied guarantee does not require a 
seriousness threshold for the Australian defamatory meaning tests, that of itself is 
not an impediment to one being found.160 
At the state/territory level, only two out of the eight jurisdictions participating 
in the national defamation scheme have enacted statutory bills of rights, both of 
which contain express guarantees of ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘privacy and 
reputation’.161 So even if they could be relied upon to support the recognition of a 
seriousness threshold in the defamatory meaning tests, their effect is likely to be 
limited at this stage. 
Nevertheless, the absence of this potential catalyst does not necessarily 
foreclose the discovery of a seriousness threshold in the Australian defamatory 
meaning tests based on Thornton reasoning. However, the force of this proposition 
does depends on the correctness of the Thornton revision of Lord Atkin’s test and, 
to the extent necessary, the availability of the Jameel proportionality principle, or 
something akin to this principle, in Australia. 
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D The Emergence of the Bleyer Proportionality Principle 
In Bleyer, the New South Wales (‘NSW’) Supreme Court granted a permanent stay 
of defamation proceedings pursuant to Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 67 
(‘CPA’) ‘on the grounds that the resources of the court and the parties that will have 
to be expended to determine the claim are out of all proportion to the interest at 
stake’.162 Justice McCallum characterised ‘such disproportionality … as a species of 
abuse of process’.163 The proceedings arose out of search results (including 
hyperlinked material) generated by the defendant search engine, which allegedly 
conveyed imputations of criminal conduct, but had only been accessed by three 
people in Australia, only one of whom had done so after the defendant was notified 
of the alleged defamation. As the defendant corporation was based in the United 
States, it was also accepted that damages would be unenforceable.164 
Bleyer has been hailed as ‘the first application of the Jameel principle in 
Australia’165 and, as such, ‘a landmark judgment’.166 However, it is arguable that the 
basis of its recognition of proportionality lies in local legal instruments and accepted 
principle either as an alternative to, if not to the exclusion of, importing Jameel into 
Australian common law. In other words, rather than simply adopting Jameel, it is 
argued that Bleyer recognised a home-grown proportionality principle emerging 
from the cradle comprising the CPA ss 56–62, 67 and the Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’), supplemented by the well accepted ‘proposition … 
that the just allocation of the finite resources of the court is a relevant consideration 
of the court’s authority, at least in civil matters’.167 This methodology is apparent 
from her Honour taking as ‘[t]he obvious starting point in determining’ what 
constitutes an abuse of process, the relevant NSW legislative instruments168 and 
expressly eschewing the need ‘to resort to … [English] law’ for that purpose.169 By 
looking to local instruments for guidance, however, McCallum J may be seen to be 
following Jameel methodology, if not directly importing its substantive results. 
The distinction is important because a local version of the proportionality 
principle will not be susceptible to attack based upon divergences from the UK legal 
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context that saw the emergence of the Jameel principle, such as the absence of an 
HRA equivalent and different court rules. If the absence of an express reference to 
proportionality in the UCPR s 56 ‘overriding purpose statement’ is relevant to the 
emergence of a local proportionality principle, it will be for reasons other than the 
inclusion of such a reference in the ‘overriding objective’ of the English rules.170 
Recognition of a home-grown proportionality principle will go a long way then to 
addressing concerns raised in pre-Bleyer case law regarding the application of the 
Jameel proportionality principle in Australia.171 But even if Bleyer is interpreted as 
importing the Jameel proportionality principle, then it is important to note that 
McCallum J downplayed the significance of HRA considerations in Jameel 
reasoning by characterising them ‘as a check or test of the correctness of the 
conclusion it would otherwise reach’,172 and also highlighting a point made earlier 
by Basten JA in Bristow v Adams173 that such considerations themselves may pull in 
different directions.174  
Justice Basten also flagged another potential obstacle to the acceptance of a 
Jameel-type proportionality principle in Australia and that is the presence of the s 33 
triviality defence in the uniform defamation legislation.175 For McCallum J, 
Basten JA was questioning whether the proportionality principle ‘can comfortably 
sit alongside the [triviality] defence’,176 to which her Honour responded in the 
affirmative, on the basis that: 
The source of the power to stay proceedings as an abuse of process is the 
institutional authority of the court. Defences protect defendants. The existence 
of a defence to the action is of little avail to the court in protecting the integrity 
of its own processes (assuming, as I think I should, that includes the fair and 
just allocation of finite resources).177 
In other words, the two mechanisms are directed to protecting different interests and 
stakeholders in a defamation action and, in that sense, operate in different spaces. 
Judge Gibson, speaking extra-judicially, however, distilled an alternate question 
from Basten JA’s reference going to the ‘sufficien[cy]’ of the statutory triviality 
defence.178 The question might be framed in terms of whether a proportionality 
principle is necessary given the provision of the statutory triviality defence. The 
answer to this question turns on the scope of the defence, a matter upon which Judge 
Gibson expressed some misgivings, especially in the online space.179 The limited 
scope of the s 33 defence is explored in more detail in the next section. 
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The emergence in Australia of a proportionality principle as a case 
management tool — whether it be a Jameel import or a local product akin to Jameel 
— is significant for the question of a seriousness threshold for the Australian 
defamatory meaning tests, because it could act as a driver or catalyst for the location 
of this threshold if and to the extent additional support is required. It could even also 
act as a proxy for absent HRA considerations to the extent necessary. 
However, the force of these arguments is limited somewhat at this stage by 
the limited penetration to date of the Bleyer proportionality principle, both upwards 
in the NSW court hierarchy and outwards across other Australian jurisdictions. The 
principle has been applied in NSW as a ground for staying or dismissing defamation 
proceedings as an abuse of process by McCallum J in the Supreme Court,180 and 
Gibson DCJ in the District Court.181 Further, its application in both courts is now 
supported by Practice Notes.182 However, it has yet to secure appellate approval. 
Nevertheless, the NSW Court of Appeal in Ghosh Appeal183 arguably left the door 
open in the observation that, ‘the dismissal of proceedings simply upon the basis of 
a lack of proportionality, without the presence of further factors favouring that result, 
is likely to be justified only rarely’.184 To say the proportionality principle operates 
‘only rarely’ concedes that it at least operates, albeit to a limited extent. And, more 
recently the principle did not attract adverse comment from that Court in Toben v 
Nationwide News Pty Ltd.185 It might be said then that the principle is currently ‘in 
park’ at the appellate level in NSW, waiting for an appropriate case that squarely 
raises the issue. 
In the meantime, however, the Bleyer proportionality principle is also 
struggling to gain a foothold outside NSW. The challenge appears to be one of 
gaining traction in statutory contexts varying from that prevailing in NSW, 
especially as regards court legislation and rules, and notably in the absence of an 
equivalent to CPA ss 56 and/or 60.186 An interesting question arises, however, as to 
whether the principle may be disconnected from that context and located more 
directly in the ‘inherent jurisdiction [of ‘every court’] to stay proceedings which are 
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an abuse of its process’.187 If it can,188 then the variation in the state/territory statutory 
contexts may not pose a problem for the emergence of a proportionality principle in 
each state and territory, although it will not necessarily guarantee the operation of a 
uniform proportionality principle in all Australian jurisdictions. Different statutory 
contexts may, nevertheless, exert different influences on and shape differently the 
contours of that principle so that different versions of the principle may operate in 
different states and territories. This disparateness could compromise the principle’s 
ability to lend support to the seriousness threshold, if such support is required. 
The next step in the Smith v Lucht litigation189 is visited in the following 
section. However, it may pay now to foreshadow that the plaintiff’s defamation 
action ultimately failed at trial because the statutory triviality defence succeeded.190 
What conclusion may be drawn from this for present purposes, however, is difficult 
to say especially given that McGill DCJ in the interlocutory application cast doubt 
on whether there was relevant disproportionality in the circumstances amounting to 
an abuse of process.191 In the case, the defendant called the plaintiff ‘Dennis 
Denuto’,192 on three occasions (an email and two oral utterances), to two close 
relations of the plaintiff, while a party to a family law suit involving one of those 
relations for whom the plaintiff acted as solicitor. District Court Judge McGill 
declined to rule out the possibility of damages exceeding a nominal amount having 
regard to recent Queensland appellate authority.193 So, to what do the Smith cases 
speak? Different enquiries, depending on whether Bleyer proportionality or the 
triviality defence is in issue? Or, essentially same enquiry, about whose outcome 
reasonable minds may differ? 
E The Presence of the Statutory Triviality Defence 
A relevant feature of Australian defamation law, which is absent from the UK’s is the 
statutory triviality defence.194 Its ‘apparent purpose … [is] to … discourage actions for 
trivial defamation’,195 and is cast in terms that are similar to those of its immediate 
precursor in the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) s 13, as follows: ‘It is a defence to the 
publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the circumstances of 
publication were such that the plaintiff was unlikely to sustain any harm.’196 
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The central element of the defence is ‘the circumstances of publication’.197 
These ‘include (inter alia) the content of the publication, the extent of the 
publication, the nature of the recipients and their relationship with the applicant … 
[but] not … the previous bad reputation of a plaintiff’.198 Nor, it seems, do the 
relevant circumstances ‘include individual characteristics of the plaintiff, at least 
insofar as they are unknown to the defendant at the time of publication’.199 The 
typical combination of circumstances said to engage the defence is ‘where a slightly 
defamatory statement is made in jocular circumstances to a few people in a private 
home’,200 although it has been emphasised that it is not confined to those 
circumstances.201 To succeed, the defendant must show that at ‘the time of 
publication’,202 these circumstances displayed a ‘proneness to cause harm’,203 as 
opposed to ‘actual’ harm.204 The requisite likelihood is ‘“the absence of a real 
chance” or the “absence of a real possibility of harm”’ and not the lesser “probably 
did not suffer harm”.205 And the requisite quantum of s 33 ‘harm’ is ‘“harm” at all’ 
as opposed to ‘great or substantial harm’.206 The stringency of the resulting burden 
of proof on the defendant is well recognised,207 and so it is not surprising that the 
defence has not enjoyed a great track record,208 although it has managed to secure 
two wins of late, both of which have survived appellate scrutiny.209 The facts and 
decision in Smith Appeal have already been outlined. In Barrow v Bolt,210 the 
defence succeeded in relation to an email calling the plaintiff ‘a vexatious litigant’,211 
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sent by a journalist to the managing editor of his employer in response to a complaint 
by the plaintiff about the journalist’s blog to the Australian Press Council (‘APC’), 
which was then forwarded to the executive director of the APC. 
To examine the potential interplay between a seriousness threshold and the 
s 33 defence, the two questions employed earlier for the Bleyer proportionality 
principle will again frame the discussion. The question of ‘comfortable fit’ with the 
s 33 defence is likely to be more acute for the seriousness threshold than for the 
Bleyer/Jameel proportionality principle given that they would sit in the same plane, 
being elements, broadly speaking, of the same action, thereby facilitating potential 
for incursions into each other’s space. Complicating the task is uncertainty attending 
key aspects of both mechanisms. Questions concerning the range of considerations 
relevant to the threshold enquiry, as well as its precise setting, have already been 
flagged. For the s 33 defence, there has been uncertainty regarding the meaning of 
s 33 ‘any harm’ and, in particular, whether it extends beyond reputational injury to 
include hurt feelings.212 It is arguable that the recent majority decision of the 
Queensland Court of Appeal in Smith Appeal213 in favour of the narrow view does 
not settle the issue given there appear to be reasonable grounds for arguing that the 
ruling is obiter dicta.214 Further, it is arguable that the broader view is not without 
foundation, especially in view of the insertion of ‘any’ before ‘harm’ in s 33.215 It 
may be that the proper construction of s 33 ‘harm’-type will not be put beyond doubt 
unless and until there is an appeal to the High Court (absent legislative clarification 
in the meantime). 
If s 33 ‘harm’-type is interpreted to extend to hurt feelings, then the defence 
risks becoming ‘virtually unworkable’,216 in which case compatibility with the 
threshold would largely become a non-issue. If s 33 ‘harm’-type does not extend to 
hurt feelings, compatibility will depend in the first place on whether or not threshold 
considerations are confined to the gravity of the imputation. If they are, then there 
could be an overlap with the s 33 defence given that gravity is also one of the 
recognised ‘circumstances of publication’. It is conceivable, for example, that the 
defence may not be engaged in its classic setting, as ‘a slightly defamatory 
statement’ would arguably be knocked out by the threshold before the question of 
defences arises. In this scenario, the two mechanisms are essentially doing the same 
work and so it might be asked, why have the threshold? One answer is that it may 
offer a costs-saving benefit given that it operates early in the proceedings, as opposed 
to waiting to the end to filter out the trivial claim. However, a threshold confined to 
gravity will not deprive the defence of all work. Consider, for example, a serious 
imputation published to a handful of people. It will definitely cross the threshold 
(meaning the claim remains on foot) as its small audience will be ignored and may 
also pass the s 33 test (meaning the defence will succeed and so the claim will 
ultimately fail). It is accepted that the defence can succeed for ‘serious’ as well as 
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‘slightly defamatory’ imputations, depending on the other ‘circumstances of 
publication’,217 the key one of which in the present example is the very limited 
audience reach. 
If the threshold considerations extend beyond the gravity of the imputation, 
then the potential for overlap with the s 33 defence is much greater — although the 
extent to which threshold considerations would coincide with s 33 ‘circumstances’ 
is not clear. Nevertheless, the two mechanisms will be distinguishable at least in 
terms of their burden of proof. Whereas it would be for the plaintiff to establish the 
requisite threshold, it is for the defendant to establish the defence. Moreover, the two 
mechanisms could yield different results. Take, for example, a more-than-trivial 
imputation conveyed to a small audience. The limited publication may be enough to 
prevent the imputation crossing the threshold (meaning that the claim would fail). 
However, it is conceivable that this publication will also fail the s 33 test (meaning 
that the defence will fail and the claim may succeed). This is because of the 
demanding burden of proof required by the defence compared with that of the 
threshold. Whereas the threshold is concerned with ‘tendency to substantially harm’, 
the defence requires ‘unlikelihood of any harm at all’. In other words, an imputation 
that has the tendency to cause some harm, but less than substantial harm, will not 
cross the threshold (meaning that the claim will fail), but it will also not satisfy the 
s 33 test (meaning that the claim will succeed). 
So, what conclusions can be drawn from this state of affairs? It could be 
argued that it shows that the threshold does not sit well with the s 33 defence, which 
would tend against recognising it. Alternatively, it could be seen as grounds for 
confining the threshold to the gravity of the imputation. A third option, relevant for 
the second question, is that any problem lies with the defence and, in particular, that 
its bar is set too high. 
It is worth emphasising that even if s 33 ‘harm’-type is confined to 
reputational harm, the defence is still pitched at a ‘very high’ level.218 There are other 
factors contributing to this high setting, apart from its harm quantum. Even ‘the 
circumstances of publication’ element can have an unduly limiting effect depending 
on the weight placed by the court on the various circumstances. The defence has 
failed, for example, in the face of extremely limited publication, including to one 
person only,219 although that is not to say that such publication can never be 
serious.220 Further, the traditional approach to some of these ‘circumstances’, and 
notably communication in permanent form as well as extremely wide-audience reach 
and the potential for a healthy ‘risk of repetition or the “grape-vine effect”’,221 may 
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pose significant challenges for the defence on social network sites.222 The recent s 33 
wins in the appeals of Barrow and Smith regarding emails may not necessarily have 
had to meet all of these challenges.223 If the s 33 defence has a narrow scope of 
operation, then the potential for incompatibility with a seriousness threshold is 
considerably reduced and, with that, grounds for resisting the recognition of the 
threshold based on the s 33 defence. 
Before leaving the first question of compatibility, it is worth making explicit 
by way of consolidation of the above discussion that the threshold/defence 
compatibility will also be affected by the level at which the seriousness threshold is 
pitched. Generally speaking, the higher the threshold, the smaller the area of 
operation left for the s 33 defence. 
On the second question of necessity, a narrow scope of operation for the s 33 
defence not only leaves room but may also invite, if not call, for the introduction of 
other mechanisms to help weed out unworthy defamation claims. So, there are 
grounds for answering this question in the affirmative. Ultimately however, it will 
depend on how unworthy is conceived in the 21st century and, in particular, whether 
the rise of new communication technologies, such as social network sites, and the 
way people use them, requires revisiting traditional notions of ‘triviality’. 
VII Scrutinising the Australian Defamatory Meaning Tests 
for a Seriousness Threshold 
The stage is now set to scrutinise the Australian tests of defamation for a seriousness 
threshold and to determine whether external assistance is needed and available — 
and, if so, to what extent.224 
The finding in Thornton that the ‘shun and avoid’ test as well as the ‘hatred’ 
and ‘contempt’ tests each carry a seriousness threshold inherent in their terms will 
probably not give rise to much controversy in Australia, notwithstanding the absence 
of a HRA-equivalent in all of the Australian jurisdictions. Nor would the finding in 
Thornton that these thresholds are probably pitched ‘too high’. Even if these tests 
were viewed through an HRA lens in Thornton, anything thereby added is arguably 
negligible to what is yielded on a bare reading of these tests given the nature and 
strength of their terms. 
As noted above in Part VI(A), a seriousness threshold has already been 
located in the Australian ‘ridicule’ test by Australian case law and the more pressing 
question is whether it is pitched at an appropriate level. It is not clear, for example, 
what ‘more than a trivial degree of ridicule’ means and whether, for example, it 
equates with ‘substantial’ or sits somewhere below this level and, if so, how far 
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below. In addition, concern has been expressed that the current setting may not be 
sensitive enough to exclude satire,225 although that is not to say that there is 
necessarily consensus as to what satire is and whether all satire should be protected 
and protected equally. 
While still featuring regularly in defamation pleadings, these old definitions 
have relatively little work to do outside of the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general test’. That 
test is the test ordinarily applied in Australia and so is the key test to interrogate for 
a seriousness threshold. And it is in relation to this test that controversy around the 
existence of a seriousness threshold is likely to arise. Like its English progenitor 
(Sim),226 a seriousness threshold is not immediately apparent on its terms, at least 
not in the Thornton sense of ‘adverse consequences’.227 While deployment of the 
‘ordinary reasonable person’ as the hypothetical referee may incorporate a 
seriousness threshold, as suggested in Daniels,228 it may not coincide with the 
Thornton seriousness threshold without an ‘adverse consequences’229 dimension. 
Controversy is also likely to attend the impact of differences between the Australian 
and UK legal and constitutional contexts, especially around the existence or 
otherwise of drivers for the recognition of a seriousness threshold. 
As explained in Part VI(C) above, a Thornton-style seriousness threshold can 
exist in the absence of both the HRA and the Jameel proportionality principle 
depending on the strength of Tugendhat J’s analysis of Lord Atkin’s speech in Sim. 
While Lord Atkin’s rediscovered passage has not escaped judicial attention in 
Australia,230 it is arguable that its capacity to ground the threshold is undermined by 
ambiguity. Lord Atkin appears to be setting a threshold in this passage, but it is not 
clear to what this threshold is directed. ‘[E]xhibitions of bad manners or 
discourtesy’231 could sound in defamation, but they may not. So, is the threshold 
directed to delineating between defamation and no defamation (without regard to 
seriousness) or between different grades of defamation? The latter assumes that there 
is defamation in the first place. The approach taken in the Australian case referring 
to this passage is consistent with the former interpretation.232 
To the extent that Tugendhat J’s analysis of Sim may be challenged, however, 
the significance of the absence of the HRA may be weakened in Australian eyes by 
local judicial acknowledgement that its relevant considerations, and notably freedom 
of expression (ECHR art 10) and the right to a fair trial (ECHR art 6), may pull in 
different directions.233 Moreover, the absence of this UK driver may be compensated 
to a significant extent by the emergence in Australia of a Jameel-like proportionality 
principle, in the form of the Bleyer proportionality principle, as part of a court’s case 
management toolbox. To reiterate, saying that both HRA and Jameel require a 
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seriousness threshold in the UK does not necessarily mean that both (or their 
equivalents) are required to sustain a seriousness threshold in another jurisdiction. 
One may suffice (and on both counts). It may be argued, then, that the emergence of 
the Bleyer proportionality principle in Australia requires the recognition of a 
seriousness threshold for the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general test’. However, even if the 
Bleyer proportionality principle is capable of acting as such a catalyst, its strength in 
that regard is weakened at this stage by the absence of appellate approval, as well as 
its limited jurisdictional reach — the extension of which beyond NSW is not without 
difficulty. 
An argument based on the presumption of damage per se has the potential to 
resonate in Australia given that that presumption is a recognised ‘basic principle of 
defamation law’.234 However, as framed in Thornton, based on an apparently 
HRA/Jameel moderated version of the presumption, it may lose traction before 
Australian courts, at least at this early stage of Jameel-equivalent recognition. 
Further, even if the s 1(1) ‘serious harm’ requirement does abolish the presumption 
of damage in the UK, that abolition does not, of itself, automatically extend to 
Australian law. Moreover, it does not necessarily mean that adopting the Thornton 
seriousness threshold in Australia will have the same effect because, as demonstrated 
in Part IV above, they are different tests. Although removing one of the planks of 
Thornton reasoning could be destabilising to its threshold, any such effect is likely 
to be limited given that it was only a subsidiary plank and confined to English law. 
The steps taken in NZ towards locating a ‘seriousness threshold’ in its 
common law tests of defamatory meaning will pique interest in Australia — 
although there are limitations on the persuasiveness of their guiding authorities for 
Australia at this stage. Nevertheless, the broad tenor of the policy considerations 
advanced in CPA Australia,235 especially regarding the savings (and not just 
financial) to be made from weeding out unworthy defamation claims, are of 
relevance in Australia and sound in the objects of the Australian uniform defamation 
legislation ‘[to avoid] plac[ing] unreasonable limits on freedom of expression’, ‘to 
provide effective and fair remedies [for reputational harm]’, and ‘to promote speedy 
[dispute resolution]’.236 While these considerations also speak to the s 33 defence, 
there is arguably an important difference in that the savings to be made from a 
seriousness threshold are potentially greater given that it would operate as a front-
end mechanism and save a trip to the defences in an unworthy claim. A possible 
counterargument might be made, based on the potential for duplication arising from 
the use of multiple mechanisms in certain circumstances and the associated ‘costs’ 
in terms of additional complexity and expense. However, to the extent that the s 33 
defence is limited in its scope, the undesirable consequences of any duplication will 
be reduced. 
Assuming that the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general test’ is found to carry a 
threshold of seriousness, the next question is at what level is it pitched? In particular, 
is it the same as in Thornton (of ‘substantial’), or lower? To the extent that Lord 
Atkin’s rediscovered passage is capable of supplying the threshold for this test, its 
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level is arguably at least the same as that conveyed by the examples provided in that 
passage. But the highest this might be put is ‘more than trivial’. That would make it 
consistent with the threshold already recognised for the ‘ridicule’ test in Australia. 
To the extent that Bleyer may be relied upon to support a seriousness threshold, the 
question becomes whether this may also raise the bar in the way that the Jameel 
proportionality principle may have done for the Thornton seriousness threshold. An 
affirmative answer to this question seems to be less forthcoming if, as contended by 
this article, Bleyer gives rise to a home-grown proportionality principle, as opposed 
to importing the Jameel proportionality principle into Australian common law 
having regard to its ‘real and substantial tort’ dimension. 
Finally, although the position is not certain, it is arguable that locating a 
seriousness threshold in the Australian defamatory meaning tests is compatible with 
the s 33 defence, given its limited availability. However, compatibility may entail 
some accommodation being made to the threshold in the form of confining its 
consideration to the gravity of the imputation and possibly also moderating the level 
at which it is pitched. The lower the threshold level, the less likely it is to be 
incompatible with the s 33 defence (in the sense of depriving it of work). But, by the 
same token, the less likely it is to be able to supplement the s 33 defence in the task 
of filtering out unworthy defamation claims and so stake a claim to its recognition 
on the basis of necessity. 
VIII Final Reflection 
A tenable argument may be made that the Australian common law tests of 
defamation already carry a Thornton-type seriousness threshold inherent in their 
terms notwithstanding the absence of an HRA equivalent and also notwithstanding 
the existence of the s 33 triviality defence. Should additional support be required to 
locate the threshold for the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general test’, then the Bleyer 
proportionality principle may be called upon — albeit arguably not to its full 
potential at this time. Certain policy considerations may also assist, especially 
around the advantages of front-end mechanisms compared with back-end 
mechanisms for limiting unworthy defamation claims. 
Assuming a seriousness threshold can be recognised, what difference will it 
make? If the threshold is inbuilt, and has essentially always been there (albeit 
undeclared), then it may be argued that to recognise it as such will have little, if any, 
practical impact in terms of the outcome of cases. Nevertheless, it may be countered 
that its express recognition is important in several ways. First, in making transparent 
the true nature and operation of the defamatory meaning tests — and, in particular, 
that some imputations, though otherwise defamatory, may be eliminated for failure 
to meet the threshold. Second, in enhancing the serviceability of the threshold by 
enabling greater threshold sensitivity on the part of both the parties and the courts. 
Third, in opening the threshold to scrutiny, evaluation and the possibility of review 
and reform if considered necessary. And in that regard, it is easier to argue for a 
change to a threshold that exists than to argue for its introduction in the first place. 
Fourth, and importantly, the recognition of a seriousness threshold may invite a 
remodelling of the Radio 2UE Sydney ‘general test’, in the way it did for Neill LJ’s 
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Berkoff test in Thornton, to make both the existence of the threshold and the level at 
which it is pitched more apparent. 
The question, however, is whether the discovered threshold goes far enough 
to contribute effectively to addressing the policy imperatives around the limitation 
of unworthy defamation claims. Although the setting for the Radio 2UE Sydney 
‘general test’ is not completely certain, it is unlikely to be higher than ‘more than 
trivial’. A higher level is not immediately apparent from either Lord Atkin’s 
rediscovered passage in Sim or the Bleyer proportionality principle. Whether it 
should be higher invites consideration of a range of factors, including: the high costs 
of defamation litigation; over-taxed court resources; and the apparent trends of 
ordinary people suing ordinary people in defamation237 and for litigants to proceed 
self-represented.238 But, at the heart of the question is what constitutes ‘unworthy’ 
in this context? Traditionally, the metric used has been expressed in terms of 
‘triviality’, but that is a multi-factorial concept that does not speak clearly at a 
universally accepted pitch. It may also need reconceptualising in order to remain 
relevant in the new communication paradigms provided by online technologies. In 
addition, an ‘unworthy’ claim may not necessarily relate to ‘unworthy’ speech. A 
seriousness threshold may not only weed out ‘trivial’ claims, but also claims relating 
to valuable speech. The challenge, however, is to calibrate the threshold so that it 
can be sensitive to this difference. 
If there is an Australian seriousness threshold, but it is pitched too low to be 
able to address effectively 21st century needs in relation to unworthy defamation 
claims, then simply recognising it may not be enough to stave off the need for 
(further) reform. It may even provoke reform in the interests of reducing the 
unnecessary duplication, complexity and associated costs potentially attending what 
would be a unique ‘[triple]-track approach to the elimination of trivial defamation 
claims’ for Australia,239 consisting of a Thornton-type seriousness threshold, the 
Bleyer proportionality principle and the s 33 triviality defence. But would an 
appropriately pitched threshold fare any better? In particular, would it stave off calls 
to adopt the English statutory ‘serious harm’ test? It is difficult to come to a 
concluded view about this while critical features of the new statutory test are still 
being worked out by the English courts. But as the authorities currently stand, 
adopting it poses a very different proposition to recognising a Thornton-style 
threshold, from the method of its implementation to its ramifications for defamation 
principles, not to mention its impact on litigation costs. The degree of increased 
strictness over the Thornton threshold also remains to be seen. It may turn out that a 
statutory ‘serious harm’ test is not ‘worth the candle’240 for Australia, at least not in 
its present form. 
In the meantime, however, this article contributes to the local conversation 
around improving the law’s capacity to exclude unworthy defamation claims by 
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shining a light on what appears to be the largely overlooked option of recognising a 
seriousness threshold in the Australian defamation tests,241 operating either with or 
without the support of the emerging Bleyer proportionality principle. This revelation 
is important, given the shortcomings of the primary mechanism for filtering out 
unworthy defamation claims in the form of the s 33 triviality defence. Something 
extra is required in the interests of maintaining a proper balance between freedom of 
speech and protection of reputation, as well as avoiding placing an unreasonable 
burden on the administration of justice in terms of resources, costs and delay. The 
analysis in this article will also assist with evaluating the need for adopting 
additional or alternative filters, such as the English statutory ‘serious harm’ 
requirement, by revealing that the proper basis from which to make such assessments 
is one that includes a seriousness threshold, as opposed to no threshold at all. 
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